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Abstract
Corporations across the world are highly interconnected in a large global network
of corporate control. This paper investigates the global board interlock network, cov-
ering 400,000 firms linked through 1,700,000 edges representing shared directors be-
tween these firms. The main focus is on the concept of centrality, which is used to
investigate the embeddedness of firms from a particular country within the global net-
work. The study results in three contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge for
the first time we can investigate the topology as well as the concept of centrality in
corporate networks at a global scale, allowing for the largest cross-country compari-
son ever done in interlocking directorates literature. We demonstrate, amongst other
things, extremely similar network topologies, yet large differences between countries
when it comes to the relation between economic prominence indicators and firm cen-
trality. Second, we introduce two new metrics that are specifically suitable for compar-
ing the centrality ranking of a partition to that of the full network. Using the notion of
centrality persistence we propose to measure the persistence of a partition’s centrality
ranking in the full network. In the board interlock network, it allows us to assess the
extent to which the footprint of a national network is still present within the global net-
work. Next, the measure of centrality ranking dominance tells us whether a partition
(country) is more dominant at the top or the bottom of the centrality ranking of the
full (global) network. Finally, comparing these two new measures of persistence and
dominance between different countries allows us to classify these countries based the
their embeddedness, measured using the relation between the centrality of a country’s
firms on the national and the global scale of the board interlock network.
Keywords: centrality, large-scale network analysis, corporate networks, interlocking
directorates
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1 Introduction
Although often depicted as atomistic and individualistic market actors, corporations are
tightly embedded in networks of power and control. Foundational elements of these net-
works are interlocking directorates, where officers of one firm also serve on the board of
another firm. Increasingly, these hitherto national business communities’ networks now
form a global network of corporate control [19, 20, 21, 27, 41]. We refer to this struc-
ture of interlocking directorates as the global board interlock network, which is in fact an
undirected network (graph) consisting of firms (nodes) and particular relationships (edges)
between these firms. Two firms are connected if they share a common senior level direc-
tor, officer or board member, essentially modeling the social ties that exist between firms.
Our global corporate network is based on nearly 400,000 firms and more than 1,700,000
board interlock ties between firms. A geographical visualization of this network is given
in Figure 1, illustrating the dense interconnectedness of our global economy through board
interlocks.
A network modeling approach allows the use of existing metrics and techniques for
analyzing and mining networks that have been suggested for a range of real-world net-
works [37]. It turns out that the structure of the considered global corporate network has
a power law degree distribution, meaning that the number of nodes with very few con-
nections is large, whereas there are a smaller number of hub-like nodes with a very high
degree. Moreover, nodes cluster together, forming a larger than random number of closed
triangles of connections. Despite the low density of the network, the average distance
(number of hops) between two nodes is relatively low, altogether referred to as the small
world property [26, 27]. This paper focuses on centrality measures, techniques commonly
employed in small world networks for assessing the importance of a node with respect
to the other nodes, based on the structure of the network. Well-known examples of such
measures that originate from the field of social network analysis are degree centrality,
eigenvector centrality, closeness centrality and betweenness centrality [4, 5].
Networks of interlocking directorates have been studied for over 100 years, and there is
an extensive body of literature discussing the causes and consequences of board interlocks,
see for example the excellent overview in [31]. In board interlock networks, node (firm)
centrality is widely considered as an indication of a powerful or at least advantageous
position [33, 36]. An extensive body of literature discusses the relationship between the
economic performance of a firm and centrality [1, 10, 22, 28, 30]. However, this literature
has found diverse outcomes in different countries when it comes to the precise relation
between centrality and firm performance. We adopt the argument that the ordering of
the nodes determined by a centrality measure is an indicator of the economic order of
power. Given that powerful firms are typically larger players in the economy, a comparison
of centrality with an economic performance indicator may give us some indication as to
which centrality measure is most representative for finding powerful actors in the global
corporate network. So, in the global corporate network, we say that centrality gives an
indication of the importance of a firm within the global system of corporate control.
Although globalization has led to a world-wide connected network of firms, if a stan-
dard hierarchical community detection algorithm (to detect groups of nodes that are more
connected with each other than with the rest of the network) is applied to the global cor-
porate network, the resulting communities have a clear regional character [20, 21]. In line
with earlier studies [8], this reveals that the footprint of the national networks is still visible
in the global network. The fact that the global network is actually comprised of multiple
smaller national networks indicates a so-called multi-level structure [25, 29]. This has
important implications for the use of centrality as an indicator of firm prominence.
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Figure 1: Geographical visualization of the global board interlock network, consisting
of around 400,000 firms and over 1,700,000 board interlocks. Visualized using Gephi
(http://gephi.org).
First, firms have a certain central or less central position within the entire (global)
network, but also within the partition of their respective national network. And these two
may very well differ: a firm can be central in a national network but relatively peripheral
in the global network. A key methodological question addressed in this paper is therefore
how centrality measures can be interpreted, compared and understood on the various global
and national scales of the network using quantitative measures. A comparison between
local and global centrality rankings is far from trivial, firstly because the rankings that we
compare are not of equal length, and second because one (the national) ranking’s nodes
are always included in the other (global) ranking. We will survey existing metrics for
comparing centrality rankings and propose two new methods to compare such rankings in
Section 4. The goal of these new metrics is to provide additional insight in how power and
control at the national level of a country’s corporate network is persistent and dominant at
the global level.
Second, as a result of the aforementioned multi-level structure we may be interested in
how certain sets of firms, for instance those that are domiciled within a particular country,
are embedded in the global network. For this we will look at the differences between
local and global centrality measures, as it provides insight in how the considered partition
(national network) is embedded in the full network (globally). So, in addition to comparing
descriptive static topological network properties between countries, as is also done for
example in [7], we attempt to better understand the embeddedness of countries in the
global corporate network based on the relation between local and global centrality.
The three contributions of this paper are as follows. First and foremost, we discuss,
compare, propose and evaluate existing as well as two new methods for quantitatively com-
paring centrality rankings at multiple scales of a network, such as the global and national
scales in the considered corporate networks. Second, we conduct a cross-country com-
parison, comparing the topology of the global network to and between various national
networks, including an analysis of how centrality relates to economic prominence indica-
tors at the local and global scale. Third, using the newly proposed metrics and the insight
in the local topologies, we are able to quantitatively compare, classify and rank countries
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based on their position within the network structure of the global economic order.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After discussing related work in
Section 2, Section 3 formally defines the considered corporate network at a local and a
global scale. It furthermore gives a short review of the various centrality measures that we
consider, before discussing and proposing various ways of comparing them at different lev-
els of the network in Section 4. Next, the topology of our global corporate network dataset
as well as the various national networks are investigated in Section 5. We apply centrality
measures to our board interlock network in Section 6, specifically to better understand dif-
ferences between centrality within the national networks and the global network. To do so,
we experiment with the new comparison metrics proposed in the preceding section, using
the obtained results to conduct an in-depth cross-country comparison. Finally, conclusions
and suggestions for future work are given in Section 7.
2 Related Work
In this section we briefly survey literature on the analysis of corporate networks and board
interlock networks, as well related work on centrality measures and means of comparing
them. Finally, we discuss literature that deals with applying centrality specifically to board
interlock networks.
Apart from interlocking directorates, corporate networks can model relationships be-
tween firms based on a number of different types of ties, including trade [42], borrowing
and lending of money [3] and ownership, creating a network in which two firms are linked
if one firm owns a certain percentage of another firm [40, 41]. In corporate networks,
community detection algorithms, to find groups of firms that are more connected with each
other than with the rest of the network, are frequently applied [20, 34, 40]. For both board
interlock as well as ownership networks, it has been suggested that the communities that
arise from the global corporate network have a clear regional character.
Interlocking directorates, i.e., the fact that a person sits on two or more corporate
boards, are of great interest to scholars from a variety of disciplines, including political
science, sociology, business administration, and more recently, network science. Together,
interlocking boards connect the top decision making bodies of our economies in a “social”
corporate network. These networks have been an object of study for over 100 years, dat-
ing back to the early 20th century, featuring the 1905 study by Jeidels [24] of the board
interlocks between German banks and industrial firms. Corporate governance networks
kept inspiring researchers throughout the 20th century. As described in [31], in an exten-
sive body of literature the causes of interlocks were attributed to collusion, cooptation and
monitoring (for example banks keeping an eye on firms they invested in), legitimacy (hir-
ing board members with a particular reputation in a certain area that is of importance to
the firm), individual career advancement and social cohesion (social ties among the upper
class). It was established that these networks of board interlocks furthermore facilitate the
spread of governance routines and practices, the exchange of resources, communication
and the dissemination of new ideas [6]. Beyond the boardroom, the role of other types
of social ties between directors was also found to be of significant influence on a number
of the aforementioned aspects [2]. The consequences of well-connected boards are typi-
cally described in terms of corporate control and power, the embeddedness of firms within
some economical system and to some extent, firm performance [28, 31]. Studying board
interlock networks furthermore gave rise to a debate on the existence of a transnational
capitalist class [8], and differences in behavior between nationally and transnationally ori-
ented boards were shown for example in [32].
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Centrality has long been a basic concept in the study networks of interlocking direc-
torates, in the beginning focusing mainly on degree centrality. As social network analysis
gained more popularity, new centrality measures were proposed and applied to understand
networks of interlocking directorates [14], for example to see differences between banks
and nonbanks [30]. In [22] it is argued that the function of monitoring and the provisioning
of resources of well-connected board has an effect on firm performance. However, when it
comes to the precise relationship of firm performance and topological board interlock net-
work measurements, the results are diverse. Correlations between centrality and economic
performance are frequently demonstrated, but differ in strength across studies. For exam-
ple, in [28] it was shown that higher node centrality in the United States results in better
boardroom performance, measured using a number of economic performance indicators.
In [23], it was found that in the United Kingdom, the connectedness of directors and thus
their boards is positively associated with firm performance, and a similar conclusion is
drawn in [11] for director networks.
There are also a number of works such as [1] that, using the case of Germany, suggest a
negative correlation between firm performance and centrality. In [10], using data on listed
firms in Italy and a comparison with a number of previous works, it is argued that there
are certainly significant differences between countries with respect to the correlation of
board centrality and economic performance. Furthermore, the causal relationship between
the connectedness of boards and the aforementioned consequences is not always clear, see
for example the discussion in [31]. In many papers it is left for future work to determine
whether there is a causal effect, to study the differences between countries, or to scale up to
sufficient data for a fair cross-country comparison. Such a comparison is difficult, because
datasets of board interlock networks have different sources, and are frequently based on
manually gathered data from annual reports. As a result, studies differ in terms of the
number of firms that is studied and the point in time at which the study was done, making
it hard to objectively compare results.
In this paper we address a number of these issues, as we consider the largest 1 million
firms across the globe, allowing us to compare results with sufficient data in each country.
The causal effects remain beyond the scope of this work, as we are foremost interested in
understanding centrality at and between different national and global scales of the global
corporate network network. Our work differs from studies such as [13] in a sense that
we still want to take the connectedness of the nodes within a particular partition of the
full network into account, rather than merging all of the subset’s nodes into one. To the
best of our knowledge, this work is the first study in which the global corporate network
is analyzed at such a large scale, particularly in the context of centrality, investigating the
embeddedness of countries in the global network of corporate control.
3 Preliminaries
This section briefly describes the notation used throughout the paper to describe the various
network aspects considered in our analyses. Apart from some general graph-theoretic
terms and definitions, we formalize the two specific types of networks: the global corporate
network consisting of firms across the globe, and national corporate networks of firms
and interlocks from a particular country. We furthermore give a definition of centrality
measures in the context of corporate networks.
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3.1 Global corporate network
The global corporate network is in fact a labeled undirected weighted network (graph)
G = (V,E,ω,φ). In this network, set of nodes V nodes represent firms (also referred to
as boards, companies or corporations). The set of edges E contains unordered pairs {u,v}
(with u,v ∈ V and u 6= v) between two firms, denoting the fact that they share a common
senior level director or officer, also referred to as a board interlock. We use n and m for
the number of nodes |V | and the number of edges |E|, respectively. The value of deg(v)
stands for the degree, defined as the number of edges containing node v, so the number of
interlocks of a particular firm’s board.
We aggregate possible parallel edges between firms (firms that have more than one
common senior level director) by assigning a positive integer weight ω(e) ≥ 1 to each
edge e∈ E, indicating the number of common senior level directors between the two firms.
A path is a sequence of nodes such that each subsequent pair in this sequence is directly
connected via an edge in the network. A shortest path is a path of minimal length, and the
length of such a path, starting at u and ending at v, is a measure indicating the distance
between nodes u and v, denoted d(u,v). If for a particular maximal subset of nodes V ′ ∈V
there exists a path between all pairs of nodes in V ′, then V ′ is called a connected compo-
nent. The largest connected component is referred to as the giant component. If two nodes
are in different components, then there is no path between them and their pairwise distance
is assumed to be infinite.
The country φ(v) of a firm v ∈ V is defined by the function φ → H which maps each
firm to one element of the set of countries in the world, denoted H.
3.2 National corporate network
For each of the countries, a national corporate network Gh = (Vh,Eh,ωh) consisting only
of the nodes and edges of a country h ∈H can be constructed. For the network of a certain
country h, we define Vh = {v ∈V : φ(v) = h} and Eh = { {v,w} ∈ E : φ(v) = φ(w) = h }.
Note that ∪h∈HVh = V , but ∪h∈HEh ⊆ E, i.e., the union of the national node sets is the
global node set, but the union of the national edge sets is not. This is due to the fact
that transnational ties between firms of different countries are not included in any of the
national networks, but are present in the global network.
A different way of classifying countries within the global network would be to say that
each country is actually a partition of the network, where the edges within the partition
are national ties and edges between different partitions are transnational ties. In theory,
different unconnected components of the national network of some country may be indi-
rectly connected through another country, so via transnational ties in the global corporate
network. For all countries discussed in this paper, we found that the giant component of
the national network was also part of the giant component of the full network.
3.3 Centrality measures
To determine the important actors in a network based on the structure of the network,
centrality measures are commonly employed. A centrality measure M assigns a function
value CM(v) to each node v∈V , indicating the extent to which node v has a central position
in the network, based on the structure of the network. Here we ignore the edge weights.
A centrality ranking is simply a particular ordering on the set of nodes such that the for
every subsequent pair u,v in this ranking, CM(u) ≥CM(v). The list of top-k most central
nodes of a particular network can thus be identified by sorting the set of nodes based on
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their centrality value, and then selecting the k nodes with the highest centrality value. The
four centrality measures considered in this work are:
Degree centrality
Cd(v) =
deg(v)
n−1
Closeness centrality
Cc(v) =
1
∑w∈V d(v,w)
Betweenness centrality
Cb(u) = ∑
v,w∈V
v6=w,u6=v,u 6=w
σu(v,w)
σ(v,w)
Here, σ(u,w) is the number of shortest paths from u to w and σv(u,w) is the number
of shortest paths that run through node v.
Eigenvector centrality
Ce(v) = EV (v)
This measure assumes that each node’s centrality is based on the centrality values of
the nodes that it is connected to, i.e., its neighbours. It can be computed by iteratively
setting EV (v) of all nodes v ∈ V to the average of that of its neighbours, where the
initial values of EV (v) are proportional to the degrees of the nodes, normalizing
after each step.
Although numerous other centrality measures have been suggested in literature, we believe
that these four measures are the most common ones. More importantly, they each capture
a different type of centrality. Respectively, they are based on a local property of the nodes
(degree centrality), the average distance from the node to every other node (closeness
centrality), the number of shortest paths that runs through a node (betweenness centrality)
and the centrality of the node based on some iterative neighborhood-based propagation
model (eigenvector centrality). Each of the four measures can be normalized to the interval
[0,1] by dividing it by the largest value over all nodes. This results in a situation in which
a higher value indicates that the node is more central according to the considered measure.
For a thorough review and analysis of the computational issues involved in determining
the different centrality measures, we refer the reader to [4, 5].
In this study, the use of centrality measures in both the national and the global networks
is considered, resulting in two “levels” at which we can define centrality:
1. Global centrality: the centrality of a firm within the global corporate network, so
considering all edges and ignoring the country attribute.
2. National centrality: the centrality of a firm within the corporate network of one
country, taking into account only the edges between nodes of the particular country.
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These two levels are essentially specialized cases of centrality in some original network
and centrality computed just within a certain partition of that network. We are particularly
interested in comparing the centrality values of firms on a global scale to centrality values
on the national scale, so based on a certain country. The main question is then how we
should we actually compare national and global centrality rankings, which is the topic of
the following section.
4 Centrality comparison techniques
Now that have the “ingredients” to model networks and to compute centrality at different
scales of the corporate network, let us consider how we are going to interpret and compare
them. The application of a centrality measure to a network dataset results in a ranking of
nodes based on their structural position in the network. The advantage of using a ranking is
that it counters the problems involved in bluntly comparing (averages of) centrality values
between networks, as these values are inherently incomparable due to the different struc-
ture (size, density, clustering, etc.) of the compared networks. The main methodological
question addressed in this section is therefore:
How can we compare two different centrality rankings, possibly of different length, where
the objects of one ranking are a subset of the other?
Ideally, we capture the relation between the two rankings in one properly normalized num-
ber, so that it is easy to compare results quantitatively. Indeed, given the sheer size of our
network data, any manual comparison is infeasible, and the focus is therefore on an auto-
mated comparison approach. Although the issue of comparing centrality rankings is rele-
vant for the analysis of any type of network dataset, we use the global corporate network
as a running example. Figure 2 is a fictive ranking resulting from applying a particular
centrality measure to the global network (left) and a second ranking that solely bases its
centrality values on firms in Great Britain (right), indeed comparing global centrality and
national centrality as discussed in Section 3.3. The remainder of this section considers
three types of ranking comparison techniques: match-based measures, correlation-based
measures and baseline-improvement measures, introducing two new methods in the last
two categories. The discussed measures are finally summarized in Table 1.
Global
1. US AT&T INC.
2. US 7-ELEVEN INC.
3. GB ROYAL DUTCH SHELL
4. GB ERNST & YOUNG EUROPE
5. KR SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS
6. GB PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
7. CH RAIFFEISEN SCHWEIZ
8. GB KPMG EUROPE
Great Britain
1. GB ERNST & YOUNG EUROPE
2. GB PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
3. GB KPMG EUROPE
4. GB ROYAL DUTCH SHELL
Figure 2: Fictive example of top-8 most central nodes at two different scales.
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4.1 Matching-based measures
One of the most trivial ways of comparing two rankings, both of length n, is to count
the overlap in the top-k (for some 0 < k < n) of these two rankings, and expressing this
count as a percentage of k. For example, in the ranking in Figure 2, the overlap in the top-4
between the global and British ranking is 2, resulting in an overlap of 0.5. Although easy to
compute and interpret and widely used for analyzing centrality in social networks, this way
of comparing rankings does not take into account the order of the objects in the ranking:
the matched firms (GB ERNST & YOUNG EUROPE and PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS) are
ranked in a different order in the two lists, which is not reflected in this simple measure
of overlap between lists. Furthermore, when a ranking of a partition of the network is
compared to a ranking of the full network (in this example the GB partition), the difference
in the length of the lists is not considered, nor is attention given to the fact that firms may
have the same rank because their centrality values are equal. Also, we note that for smaller
values of k, the overlap is frequently equal to 0 (in the example, this would be the case for
k = 2); the cut-off always is somewhat arbitrarily chosen, and may even cut the ranking
right in the middle of a range of nodes with equal centrality values.
4.2 Correlation-based measures
Computing the relation between two equal length rankings is traditionally done using
the Spearman rank correlation coefficient, measuring the extent to which the relation-
ship between two variables can be described using a monotonic function [35]. Especially
when understanding centrality rankings in real-world network data, Spearman is frequently
used [17, 43]. Because we are interested in whether the rankings (and not so much the val-
ues) are equivalent, the measure of rank correlation is specifically suitable, as it is not
subject to the size of the considered networks or the applied method of centrality value
normalization. The advantage of applying Spearman rank correlation is that the exact dif-
ference in ranking between all pairs of nodes in both sets is taken into account. Note that if
we are not interested in the difference in ranking but merely in whether or not the distinct
pairs of nodes in the different lists are correctly ordered, we could also have used Kendall’s
tau, measuring the relation between the number of concordant (correctly ordered in both
lists) and disconcordant pairs of nodes.
Compared to matching-based methods, the advantage of correlation-based methods is
that they can take the order of objects into account, and are not biased by some arbitrary
cut-off. They are furthermore able to cope with equal centrality values. In such cases, so
when objects in the data have identical values, Spearman typically assigns a rank to these
objects that is set to the average of the rank range these objects are positioned in. This
ensures that the sum of all ranks remains intact. The only problem is that traditionally, to
compute a rank correlation, the rankings need to be of equal length.
For comparing local and global centrality rankings, we propose a new metric called
centrality persistence, and define it for some partition S ⊆V as the Spearman rank corre-
lation rc between the centrality values of the nodes in S computed based on the network of
only the nodes in S, compared to the centrality values of S, but then computed as part of the
full network’s node set V (both according to the same centrality measure M). Formally:
rc(S,V ) = Spearman-correlation(CSM,C
V
M)
Here, CXM is the vector of centrality values computed using centrality measure M applied
to the network consisting of all nodes (and edges between nodes) in set X ⊆ V , setting
a null value for nodes not in X . The function Spearman-correlation(A,B) computes the
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Spearman correlation (as described above) for the overlapping (non-null in both) entries in
A and B.
In our corporate board interlock networks, centrality persistence measures for a partic-
ular country the rank correlation between national centrality (within that country partition
S) given by the vector CSM and global centrality given by the vector C
V
M . So, it assesses
the extent to which the ranking of firms in a country (partition) is maintained (persistent,
value of 1) or distorted (value of −1) in the full dataset. In contrast to the the number of
advantages of correlation-based methods described above, we note that the unequal size of
the rankings is still a bit of a problem. Given that we only consider objects in the smaller
list, we throw away information about the position of the objects in the full ranking. In the
example in Figure 2 we would only be able to compare the relation between four British
firms in the global ranking to the national ranking, regardless of where these British firms
are positioned in the global ranking. Essentially, in comparing rankings based on corre-
lation, we investigate if the order of some ranking in the partition is preserved in the full
ranking, i.e., we measure its persistence, but we do not yet know how central the nodes in
this partition actually are in the full network.
4.3 Baseline-improvement measures
The matching-based and correlation-based techniques discussed above are not specifically
designed to handle the comparison of rankings based on a partition and rankings based on
the full network dataset. Here we propose an additional metric to solve this problem, by
assuming that the considered partition is a random sample of the data, implying that the
centrality values are simply the centrality values of nodes that are selected in a uniformly
random way from the full set of nodes. This in turn would mean that the nodes in the
partition are assumed to be uniformly distributed over the ranking. Then we compute for
the particular considered partition the extent to which the ranking of its nodes differs from
a random distribution of these nodes over the full ranking. An alternative yet functionally
equal definition would be to say that we are measuring the extent to which the subset is on
average embedded in the middle, more near the top, or near the bottom of the ranking.
Assume that a node v ∈ S according to some centrality ranking has rank r(v) ∈ [1, |V |]
in the full rank of all nodes in V , where a rank of 1 is highest (most central) and |V | is
lowest (least central). We then propose to compute the embeddedness of the partition in
the full ranking using centrality ranking dominance rd(S,V ), defined as:
rd(S,V ) =
1
2
− ∑v∈S r(v)|S| · (|V |+1)
If the value of rd(S,V ) is smaller than 0, it means that the partition is on average less
central (it has a higher than average ranking sum) in the full network, whereas a value
higher than 0 means it is on average more central (it has a lower than average ranking
sum). A partition exactly in the middle of the ranking would have a value equal to 0. More
details as well as a proof of the validity of this metric for determining rank dominance is
given in Appendix A.
In the example in Figure 2, the British firms have ranks 3, 4, 6 and 8, summing to
21, resulting in a value of rd(VGB,V ) = 12 − 21/(4 · (8+ 1)) = −0.083, meaning that the
partition of British firms is less central than expected. On the contrary, the United States
with firms at rank 1 and 2, summing to 3, has a centrality ranking dominance value of
rd(VUS,V ) = 12 −3/(2 · (8+1)) = +0.333, indeed indicating that the US firms are ranked
higher than expected.
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Table 1: Features of different centrality ranking comparison techniques.
Match-based Correlation-based Baseline-improvement
Compare lists × × ×
Handle equal centrality values × ×
Order-preserving ×
Account for rank difference × ×
Nested inequal lengths rankings ×
Centrality ranking dominance gives an indication of whether a partition has on average a
lower or higher position in the full ranking, i.e., it indicates the dominance of the partition.
In Section 6 we will use centrality ranking dominance together with the centrality persis-
tence measure to compare the embeddedness of economic power orders within countries
in the global network. Finally we note that together, these two measures cover the five
important features of ranking comparison techniques surveyed above and summarized in
Table 1.
5 Network topology
In this section, we describe how our dataset was collected, discuss its quality and provide
an overview of the (structural) properties of the resulting global corporate network, as
well as topological characteristics of the largest 34 national networks considered in our
cross-country comparison.
5.1 Data collection
The data used in this paper originates from the ORBIS database of Bureau van Dijk, which
contains information on over 100 million public and private companies worldwide. An
extraction of data on the largest firms worldwide that were registered as “very large” or
“large”, and as “active” was made in July 2013. Only companies for which information
was available on the country of domicile and the senior directors (board of directors, ex-
ecutive board, supervisory board or senior management) were selected. We include all
personal interlocks at both the senior management and board level, particularly because
of the diversity in classifications of board and top management positions across the globe.
Because we are specifically interested in the network connecting corporate boards, we in-
clude only interlocks based on persons; firms that are registered as board members are
disregarded. The result is a list of 971,891 firms and a total of 3,272,523 top executives.
5.2 Data quality
The quality of the ORBIS data is more than reasonable, and for most larger firms, the
error rate is low. Overall, ORBIS is recognized as a reliable data provider in a number
of previous works [9, 41]. An extensive study of how representative this dataset is for
the global economy based on, among other things, a comparison with the relative GDP,
is given in [20]. All in all, we are confident that our dataset captures the vast majority of
significant worldwide economic activity.
Given the large size of our dataset, a valid question is whether or not all interlocks
are present at the same time, as the duration of the interlock is not explicitly included in
the data. It should be noted that given that boards of larger companies meet every month
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and appoint their members for four years, on average re-electing a member once, there
is close to one hundred opportunities for interaction between board members, facilitating
the type of communication, interaction, exchange of ideas and resources known to come
with board interlocks (see [31] and the references in Section 2). In light of the low average
pairwise distance between nodes (see later in this section), it is thus safe to assume that we
can interpret the board interlocks as if they take place at the same time. It is anecdotally
noted in literature that if boards meet every month, given the low average pairwise node-
to-node distance of the small world interlock networks, an infectious disease affecting only
directors could wipe out the majority of the corporate elite in well under a year [12].
Finally, we note the presence of a number of administrative ties between firms in our
dataset, for example as a result of how firms organize themselves through multiple legal
entities or pyramidal structures of holding companies and corporate groups. Given the
sheer size of the data there is no way to manually filter these ties given the available data.
In line with previous work, we choose to leave these ties be, meaning that we have to take
the presence of these ties into account when interpreting empirical results. For a lengthy
discussion on the considerations around filtering these administrative ties, the reader is
referred to [20].
5.3 Network properties
The list of firms and directors extracted from the source database is essentially a two-mode
network. From this network, we can generate a projection of the firm-by-firm network by
for each director adding an edge for every distinct pair of boards that this director sits on.
This results in the global board interlock network that will be our main structure of interest.
Table 2 shows some statistics of this undirected network. Note that it only contains firms
with at least one board interlock, thus filtering non-interlocking firms and reducing the
number of firms (nodes) from 971,891 to 391,967.
The density, defined as the relation between the number of edges and the maximum num-
ber of edges, is low, as is common in many real-world networks. Figure 3 shows the degree
distribution of the network, which follows a power-law distribution and has a fat tail, again
Table 2: Global network properties.
Global corporate network
Nodes (firms) 391,967
Edges (interlocks) 1,711,968
Density 2.229 ·10−5
Average degree 8.746
Clustering coefficient 0.755
Connected components 55,616
Giant component
Nodes (firms) 238,859 nodes (60.9%)
Edges (interlocks) 1,533,030 (89.5%)
Density 5.374 ·10−5
Average degree 12.83
Clustering coefficient 0.751
Average distance 7.775
Radius 18
Diameter 34
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resembling many other real-world (social) networks [26]. The fat tail is comprised of rel-
atively few (note the logarithmic vertical axis) large firms with multiple economic entities
that share a large number of senior directors. For example, some large accounting firms
insist on all their partners being formal board members, demonstrating a type of adminis-
trative ties, as discussed in Section 5.2. Although the effect of these administrative ties is
small and merely local, it is something to take into account when studying a local metric
such as degree centrality, as we will see later.
Next, the component size distribution for all 55,616 components (excluding the largest
component of size 238,859) is given in Figure 4. We can observe that apart from the giant
component, all other components are significantly smaller: they consist of at most 60
nodes, with a clear peek at a size of 1 to 5. The vast majority of these small components
represent simple “parent/subsidiary”-structures that do not share directors with the giant
component, and are therefore hardly relevant for this study.
Going from the full network to the giant component, the number of nodes drops with
39% to 238,859. However, the number of edges drops only by 10%, indicating that the
majority of interlocking activity is captured in the 90% of edges that reside within the giant
component. Indeed, the other smaller components appear to be small isolated groups of
firms mostly from the same country. The main focus of the remainder of this paper will
therefore be on the giant component. We note that the high clustering coefficient of 0.751
is partly attributed to the way in which the network was constructed: if an officer serves
on more than one board, then all boards on which he serves are connected, automatically
realizing a larger than normal number of closed triangles, which is exactly what is reflected
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by the clustering coefficient.
Figure 5 shows the distance distribution of the largest component (sampled over 100,000
node pairs), with the average pairwise distance at 7.775, which is consistent with other
small world networks, but slightly higher than other social networks where the value is
usually around 6 or lower. The node eccentricity (length of the longest shortest path start-
ing at a particular node) distribution over all nodes in the largest connected component is
given in Figure 6, starting at the radius (18) and ending at the diameter (34) and also has
the familiar unimodal shape that is common in real-world networks [38].
Table 3 lists the most important previously discussed measures and statistics for the
34 considered national networks, identified by their ISO 2-letter country codes. The dif-
ferences in the number of firms per country are a result of the fact that some countries
are larger and economically more developed than others. Properties that can be derived
from other reported metrics have been left out for readability. The rightmost column ti-
tled “Transnat. factor” indicates the factor by which the number of edges increases if the
Table 3: Network properties of giant components of the largest 34 national networks.
ISO2 Country Nodes Density Clust. coeff. Avg. dist. Transnat. factor
AT Austria 2,142 0.00440 0.273 5.58 0.79
AU Australia 1,897 0.00382 0.085 4.94 0.58
BE Belgium 3,264 0.00254 0.123 5.17 1.57
CA Canada 5,439 0.00146 0.072 5.20 0.52
CH Switzerland 999 0.00620 0.077 4.78 1.63
CN China 891 0.00475 0.132 5.80 1.18
CO Colombia 1,951 0.00298 0.090 5.61 0.34
DE Germany 7,224 0.00142 0.320 8.15 0.63
DK Denmark 4,517 0.00229 0.163 5.61 0.78
ES Spain 11,102 0.00143 0.156 6.30 0.25
FI Finland 2,626 0.00294 0.174 5.52 1.11
FR France 8,896 0.00083 0.170 6.13 0.77
GB United Kingdom 32,962 0.00067 0.356 6.63 0.26
IE Ireland 2,497 0.01479 0.178 5.78 0.39
IL Israel 962 0.01233 0.065 3.88 0.21
IN India 5,911 0.00173 0.047 4.72 0.20
IT Italy 4,483 0.00125 0.198 7.57 0.88
JP Japan 2,605 0.00119 0.113 7.20 0.21
KR South Korea 2,802 0.00174 0.124 5.83 0.05
KY Cayman Islands 642 0.00693 0.098 5.40 3.90
LU Luxembourg 1,484 0.00705 0.196 6.72 1.55
MX Mexico 931 0.00852 0.159 4.31 0.43
MY Malaysia 7,878 0.00398 0.115 4.50 0.07
NL Netherlands 6,083 0.00271 0.225 7.61 0.84
NO Norway 8,963 0.00130 0.173 5.69 0.40
PT Portugal 2,120 0.00488 0.138 5.45 0.56
RO Romania 656 0.00648 0.189 7.63 1.92
RU Russia 2,939 0.00263 0.102 6.57 0.08
SE Sweden 6,656 0.00166 0.430 6.40 0.79
SG Singapore 1,472 0.00709 0.080 4.14 0.90
TH Thailand 981 0.00555 0.086 4.90 0.31
US United States 24,802 0.00024 0.228 6.71 0.48
VN Vietnam 1,393 0.00558 0.090 4.44 0.01
ZA South Africa 963 0.00837 0.110 4.10 0.74
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transnational ties of this country are included. We observe in Table 3 that Belgium (BE),
Switzerland (CH), China (CN), Finland (FI), the Cayman Islands (KY), Luxembourg (LU)
and Romania (RO) stand out here with a relatively high number transnational ties. This
may be a seen as evidence of the outward orientation of these countries. However, simply
counting the number of transnational ties may be a too simple approach for determining
this, as it merely considers the number of local transnational connections. Therefore we
will try to better understand this observation using more complex metrics of embeddedness
in Section 6.
Most interesting to note about Table 3 is that in each of the countries, the average
distance between nodes is low, typically much lower than the average distance of 7.775
in the full global network. The average distance over all 34 countries is 5.734, and the
weighted average distance (so, compensating for the number of firms in a country) is 6.204.
This may be a first hint to the fact that the national footprint of countries is still present in
the global network: apparently the transnational ties in the full global network are not able
to connect the national networks in such a way that the average distance remains as low as
in the national networks.
6 Centrality experiments
In this section we perform experiments using the dataset described in Section 5. First, in
Section 6.1 we directly use centrality measures in an attempt to characterize their stability
by means of a comparison with firm prominence. Then, we use the newly proposed metrics
centrality persistence and centrality ranking dominance to understand the relation between
national and global centrality in respectively Section 6.2 and Section 6.3, ending with a
number of general results and remarks in Section 6.4.
6.1 Comparing centrality measures
After applying the four different centrality measures described in Section 3.3 (between-
ness centrality, closeness centrality, degree centrality and eigenvector centrality) to the
giant component of the full global network, we can immediately observe that these mea-
sures are all correlated, in line with previous studies of centrality [4, 15]. The first four
rows of Table 4 show this correlation using the rank correlation coefficient for each pair
of centrality measures. The results in Table 4 are in line with expectations with respect
to how the measures are defined: betweenness centrality, measuring the extent to which a
node has a brokerage-like position is least correlated with the other three measures. Eigen-
vector centrality and closeness centrality are highly correlated, indeed both taking the full
network into account, considering each node contributing to the centrality value propor-
Table 4: Correlation between centrality measures and with firm prominence (revenue),
n = 238,859.
Betweenness Closeness Degree Eigenvector
Betweenness 1.000 0.430 0.521 0.356
Closeness 0.430 1.000 0.495 0.902
Degree 0.521 0.495 1.000 0.498
Eigenvector 0.356 0.902 0.498 1.000
Firm prominence 0.192 0.109 -0.046 0.064
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tional to how far away it is. Each of the considered measures is correlated with degree
centrality, being the most simple measure of centrality, merely counting the number of
local connections. Given the low average pairwise distances in real-world networks, ob-
viously the direct neighbourhood size (i.e., the degree) of a node has influence on any
centrality measure.
Now that we have an idea of the relation between the measures themselves, let us
see how the measures are related to firm prominence by comparing them with revenue.
As argued in Section 1, this provides us with an indication of which measure is most
representative for finding powerful actors in the global corporate network. The last row of
Table 4 shows the results. We observe that of the four considered measures, betweenness
centrality is most correlated with revenue at the global level, albeit a weak correlation. To
further investigate, we can look at how firm centrality within individual countries correlates
with revenue. For the largest 34 countries (listed in Table 3), the results of this experiment
on a national level are shown in Figure 7. This figure essentially visualizes the same results
as in the bottom row of Table 4, but now for each of the countries, ignoring transnational
ties. We see how in most countries, there is a weak to medium strong, but mostly positive
correlation between revenue and centrality, for almost each of the measures.
The country-specific results are in line with results regarding firm performance that
are presented for example for board interlock networks in the United States (US) [23]
and United Kingdom (GB) [28] and for director networks in [11]. At the same time they
are conflicting with studies done on the board interlock networks of Germany and Italy
presented in [1, 10]. A possible explanation for these differences may be found in the
difference between data sources as well as the differences across studies in terms of which
performance indicator the centrality metrics are compared to.
Based on our experiments, we do establish that betweenness centrality seems the most
suitable measure: apart from in Canada (CA) and Vietnam (VN) it is always weakly posi-
tively correlated with firm prominence. Indeed, we also saw this higher positive correlation
in the full global network (Table 4). Degree centrality and eigenvector centrality are in a
few countries negatively correlated with firm prominence. Manually inspecting the data
for some of the outliers based on degree centrality (the Netherlands (NL), United Kingdom
(GB) and Canada (CA)) revealed multiple large densely connected communities of firms
with very high degrees but no significant revenue, typical for the structures based on ad-
ministrative ties discussed in Section 5.2. These firms of course influence measures such as
degree and eigenvector centrality. Noteworthy is the fact that again betweenness centrality
in the Netherlands and United Kingdom shows no significant difference with other coun-
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Figure 7: Correlation between firm prominence (revenue) and national centrality for the
34 countries in Table 3.
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tries. In general, it is often said that degree centrality is a too simple measure of centrality,
as it only measures connections locally, explaining its sometimes more erratic results when
compared to revenue. As eigenvector centrality is ultimately biased towards high degree
nodes, the various negative correlations for this measure are also understandable.
There are vast differences between countries and how centrality is correlated with firm
revenue, echoing the diverse results in previous work on the relation between firm per-
formance and centrality. Apparently, at least for revenue, not in every country the well-
performing firms that hold the most central positions in the board interlock network. Fur-
thermore, we observe that across countries, the centrality values according to different
measures can differ a lot. These findings suggests that, contrary to what is sometimes
done [28], assessing the centrality of a firm by averaging different centrality values, may
at least in our case be to rigorous of an approach. Finally, we note that the correlation
between revenue and centrality in the global network is much lower than in most of the
national networks. In addition to our observations made at the end of Section 5.3, this
finding is a second piece of evidence suggesting that there are at least mechanisms at a
local (national) scale that influence tie formation in the (global) board interlock network.
6.2 Centrality persistence
The second question that we aim to answer using our centrality experiments, is whether
we can say something about how the order of firms on a national level is preserved in the
global network. We proposed a measure for this in Section 4.2 called centrality persis-
tence, measuring the persistence of the order of a country’s central firms within the global
network. Recall that to compute this metric, we compare the rank correlation between firm
centrality at the national level (so within a particular country) and the global level. The
results are shown in Figure 8 for each of the four considered centrality measures.
Degree centrality persistence shows a noteworthy result. For most countries degree
centrality values at a national and global scale are highly correlated: this is a direct result
of the fact that degree centrality measures only direct connections, and nothing beyond
that. If there is a big difference between national and global degree centrality, it means
that there is a large number of transnational ties connected to firms in these countries, as
this is the only local difference in edges between a country’s nodes in the national and
global network. Noteworthy are Switzerland (CH), Luxembourg (LU) and Cayman Is-
lands (KY), as they show the lowest degree centrality persistence values over all countries.
These countries are frequently identified in literature as having large internationally ori-
ented financial sectors [20]. The same observation holds to a lesser extent for Belgium
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Figure 8: Centrality persistence for the 34 largest countries.
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(BE), China (CN) and Finland (FI). If we compare these results to the relative number of
transnational ties listed in Table 3 in the column “Transnat. factor”, we see a clear re-
lation with degree centrality persistence. Indeed, degree centrality persistence measures
indirectly the extent to which a country has a large number of transnational ties. The
transnational factor (or a simple count of the number of such ties) is often used in lit-
erature to indicate globalizing countries based on networks of interlocking directorates,
see for example [7, 39], and degree centrality persistence essentially mirrors this aspect.
In Section 6.3 we will investigate more elaborate ways of determining whether each of
these countries with a large number of transnational ties are actually dominant globalizing
players within the world-wide economy.
As for the other measures, eigenvector and closeness centrality seem to again produce
results that are very similar to degree centrality, as explained in the previous section. Let
us now turn to the persistence of the ranking based on betweenness centrality, which we
established as the relatively most stable indicator of prominence in the previous section.
Figure 8 shows that for Switzerland (CH), Luxembourg (LU) and the Cayman Islands
(KY), analogously to degree centrality, we have low betweenness centrality persistence
values. This suggests that the appearance of additional transnational ties had significant
influence on the brokerage position of the firms in these countries as well. Ireland (IE) also
stands out here with a relatively low betweenness centrality persistence value, yet it does
not have a significantly larger number of transnational ties like the other three “outliers”.
The general conclusion here is that most countries have a high centrality persistence
value, meaning that overall, the order of firms is well-preserved in the full network. This in
turn serves as a third piece of evidence that national footprints are still inherently present
in the global network. However, what can we observe from the differences in centrality
persistence between countries, i.e., when we compare the centrality persistence values
between different countries? Specifically, what happens when we compare the values to
macro-economic indicators describing these countries?
Most notably, we observe a correlation of 0.652 (with a P-value of 2.91 · 10−5) be-
tween betweenness centrality persistence and GDP. This means that to some extent, the
higher the GDP (so, the larger the country’s economy), the higher the centrality persis-
tence value. This may indicate that, in general, countries with larger economies are also
better at exhibiting the economic order of their firms within the global economy, i.e., they
are better able to translate their power and control at the national level to the global level.
The relation between GDP and betweenness centrality persistence is plotted separately for
each of the 34 countries in Figure 9.
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We note that large economic powers such as the United States (US) and China (CN)
are also exhibiting high centrality persistence, indicating that their national economic or-
der of power hardly changes between the national and the global level. We may want to
understand why certain countries with a similar GDP have roughly the same centrality
persistence value. For example, in Figure 9, one may recognize two clusters of nodes;
one with a group of firms strictly above the fitted line and one group below it. The first
group consists mostly of developed countries such as Canada (CA), Germany (DE), France
(FR), the United Kingdom (GB), Italy (IT) and Spain (ES), but also India (IN). The second
group contains the larger Scandinavian countries, but nearby are also South Africa (ZA)
and Colombia (CO). The countries within these groups obviously exhibit significant insti-
tutional differences. A natural question is how we can better understand the differences
in centrality values of these seemingly similarly persistent countries. However, centrality
persistence only gives a characterization of how prevalent a country’s centrality ranking
is, but it does not indicate whether the ranking is more persistent near the bottom or top of
the global ranking, which we will investigate next.
6.3 Centrality ranking dominance
We discussed in Section 4 (and summarized in Table 1) that the only downside of correlation-
based comparison methods is that they do not measure very well whether a partition is
more near the top or the bottom of a ranking of the nodes in the full network. Therefore,
we now turn to experiments using the measure of centrality ranking dominance suggested
in Section 4.3. The results for computing this measure for the 34 largest countries are
shown in Figure 10. Furthermore, a diagram showing both centrality ranking dominance
and centrality persistence for each of the countries, is given in Figure 11.
Recall that based on centrality persistence (see Figure 9) we were not able to distin-
guish so well between outliers such as Switzerland (CH) and the Cayman Islands (KY).
Based on centrality dominance ranking we clearly can: these countries are quite the oppo-
site in terms of the extent to which they dominate the centrality ranking. Although both are
known for their large financial sectors, the Cayman Islands (KY) are frequently identified
as transnationally oriented for administrative reasons or even fiscal benefits [20], whereas
Switzerland is known to be an influential actor in at least the European business commu-
nity [18]. This is reflected in Figure 10 with a low dominance value for the Cayman Islands
and a high value for Switzerland.
In the previous section, we also noted that Scandinavian countries such as Sweden (SE)
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and Colombia (CO) had a similar betweenness centrality persistence value. If we look at
Figure 10 and 11, we see that they are quite different in terms of centrality ranking dom-
inance: Sweden and Finland are more represented at the top of the ranking than Colom-
bia. Typical well-developed western countries such as Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE),
France (FR), United States (US) and Sweden (SE) lead the ranking, but also South Africa
(ZA) and Mexico (MX) are ranked higher. The latter two illustrate the brokerage posi-
tion of these countries in the global economy. Mexico connects Latin America and Europa
(mostly through Spain), whereas South Africa connects the UK to Africa and parts of Asia.
Along a similar line, with centrality ranking dominance we can now better distinguish the
relatively lower ranked India (IN) from the western European countries that were observed
to have a similar GDP and betweenness centrality persistence value in Section 6.2. Near
the bottom of the ranking based on centrality dominance in Figure 10 we also find China;
apparently the Chinese firms are on average more located near the bottom of the global
ranking. On the contrary, the United States (US) which based on centrality persistence
appeared to mirror China, has a substantially higher rank and can thus be said to have
a more dominant position in the economic order. This may be due to the fact that in
Asia, board interlocks were mainly used to integrate firms operating in distinct business
groups [14, 16].
Another example of added value of the centrality ranking dominance metric is the
difference between China (CN) and Switzerland (CH). Based on the relative number of
transnational ties in Table 3 we cannot easily distinguish between the two, but using the
ranking dominance metric we can: Switzerland uses its transnational ties to obtain a dom-
inant position in the global centrality ranking, whereas China clearly does not. Indeed,
it is well-known that China is actively participating in the global economy, but is not yet
as well integrated as other countries of the same size. The result for China is also to be
expected: in previous work we already observed that especially China resides in its own
subcommunity in the global board interlock network: China is the central country of the
first persistent community discovered by a network community detection algorithm [20].
For Romania (RO), which also stood out in Table 3, we observe a similar low ranking
dominance value.
The discussion and interpretation of results presented above demonstrates how in ad-
dition to centrality persistence and a count of the number of transnational ties, the measure
of centrality ranking dominance allows us to better understand the relation between the
national and global centrality rankings of different countries.
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6.4 Discussion
The two discussed methods of centrality persistence and centrality ranking dominance
allow centrality measures to be interpreted at different scales of the network. Together,
they provide insight in the extent to which a partition is on the one hand able to preserve
its centrality ranking in the full network (persistence) and on the other hand whether the
partition is on average more near the top or the bottom of the centrality ranking in the full
network (dominance). The results of these experiments result in a number of contributions
to research on interlocking directorates.
Whereas in board interlock literature traditionally only the number of transnational
ties (as shown in Table 3) is used to characterize a country’s participation in the global
economy, we are now able to better distinguish between countries based on the extent to
which they are holding a central positions at the national and global scale of the network.
Furthermore, the two proposed measures can help understand the inward and outward
orientation of a country and its firms. Finally, they allow us to assess the embeddedness of
countries based on the concepts of persistence and dominance, allowing more fine-grained
insight in the extent to which a country is participating in the global economy.
In studying the corporate board interlock network, we do not per se find evidence
for key determinants based on intitutional patterns such as those demonstrated in [39],
but instead we do see sector effects, in particular the financial sector and its influence
on countries such as Switzerland, Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands. An extensive
investigation of the precise cultural, geo-historical, political and economical differences
and similarities of countries is nevertheless beyond the scope of this paper.
6.5 Final remarks
We stress that the two proposed metrics have potential applications in many other types of
networks that have attributes on the nodes that allow partitions of the full network to be
studied. For example, in an online social network, the country of residence of a user could
be used, whereas in scientific collaboration network the scientific field of the authors could
be used to partition the network.
We furthermore note that the experiments only report on significant correlations. For
example, the reported correlations with revenue at a firm level and GDP at a country level
are not near as strong for country-level demographics such as the population count or the
GDP per capita of a country. Even more so, it should be noted that the proposed metrics
operate independently of other topological metrics such as the number of firms (nodes),
number of interlocks (edges), nor is there a noteworthy correlation between these basic net-
work metrics and the proposed measures of persistence and dominance. All these findings
support the general argument that a network approach truly provides additional insight
compared to simply comparing countries using standard (macro-)economic attributes of
these countries.
7 Conclusion
We have investigated the concept of centrality in the global corporate board interlock net-
work as well as within different national networks. Apart from the fact that centrality
measures are obviously correlated with each other, we also find notable differences be-
tween countries. Most importantly, firm prominence and centrality do not always go hand
in hand: large differences between countries have been demonstrated. In addition to previ-
ous work in which we showed how community detection revealed the footprints of national
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networks within the global network, this paper provides additional evidence for these re-
gional effects based on both the network topology. First, we observe how on average, the
34 largest national networks are more tightly connected (based on the average pairwise
distance) than the global network. Second, we note that the relation between firm promi-
nence and revenue is stronger in most of the national networks than in the global network,
suggesting that there are mechanisms at the national level influencing the formation of
board interlocks. Third, using the newly introduced measure of centrality persistence, the
persistence of a national order of firms (ranked by centrality) within the global network is
measured, showing high persistence values for a large number of countries. This means
that for these countries, the economic order on a global scale is similar to that on the
local scale, the third piece of evidence for the aforementioned national footprints. When
comparing this persistence between countries, we find that there is a correlation with GDP:
countries with larger economies are better at preserving their firm’s central positions within
the global corporate network than countries with smaller economies, although the persis-
tence metric is not subject to the size (number of ties). The proposed centrality ranking
dominance measures furthermore indicates the extent to which a country’s firms are at a
dominant position in a centrality ranking. Together, the two newly introduced measures of
persistence and dominance give an indication of the extent to which a country’s firms are
at a central position at both a national and a global scal. The metrics allow us to get more
fine-grained insight in the dominance and persistence of power and control of a country’s
firms at different scales of the global board interlock network.
In future work, the applicability of our newly proposed measure of centrality persis-
tence and ranking dominance could be further investigated. In corporate networks, non-
geographical aspects, such as the sector in which the firm operates, could be used to define
an alternative partitioning of the firms in the global network, allowing the influence of
sectors to be investigated in a similar way as we did with countries. This will however
provide new challenges, as the sectors themselves are not necessarily as connected as
countries. Furthermore, we plan to extend this research to the full corporate network con-
sisting not only of large firms in the ORBIS database, but all firms, potentially increasing
the number of nodes to over 200 million. One question is then whether or not considering
all firms instead of just large firms influences the result, or that the majority of activity is
already captured in our current selection of firms and directors. Finally, we plan to study
the concept of centrality in corporate networks over time, as the global corporate network
is constantly evolving through the formation of new board interlock ties.
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A Centrality ranking dominance
The measure of centrality ranking dominance rd(S,V ) proposed in Section 4.3 computes
the extent to which the ranking of nodes in a partition S ⊆ V of the graph G = (V,E)
based on their centrality values is positioned near the top, middle or bottom of a ranking
of the nodes, quantified using respectively a positive, zero or negative measure value in
the range [− 12 , 12 ]. In this short section we prove that this metric accomplishes exactly the
functionality described above.
Abstracting away from the network aspect, we have a set V of objects that are ranked
according to a centrality measure, meaning that we have a one-to-one mapping function r
that maps the nodes v ∈ V to a rank integer ∈ {1,2, . . . , |V |}, where 1 is the highest rank.
We furthermore have a subset S ⊆ V for which we want to determine whether the ranks
r(s) for all s ∈ S are more dominant near the top, middle or bottom of the ranking. To do
so, the measure of centrality ranking dominance rd(S,V ) is formally defined as:
rd(S,V ) =
1
2
− ∑v∈S r(v)|S| · (|V |+1)
If S =V , then
∑
v∈S
r(v) = ∑
v∈V
r(v) =
1
2
· |V | · (|V |+1),
which means that
rd(S,V ) = rd(V,V ) =
1
2
−
1
2 · |V | · (|V |+1)
|V | · (|V |+1) =
1
2
− 1
2
= 0,
precisely indicating with a value of 0 that S is the middle of the ranking, i.e., V is in the
middle of V itself.
If |S|= 1 with S = {s}, then
rd(S,V ) = rd({s},V ) = 1
2
− r(s)|{s}| · (|V |+1) =
1
2
− r(s)|V |+1 .
For r(s) = 1, rd({s},V ) approaches a value of 12 , and similarly for r(s) = |V | the value
approaches − 12 . The metric is in that sense symmetric. When s is exactly in the middle of
the ranking, for odd size V we have r(s) = d|V |/2e, resulting in
rd({s},V ) = 1
2
− d|V |/2e|V |+1 =
1
2
− 1
2
= 0,
whereas for even size V there would be no way to get a precise value of 0 as one element
can never be exactly in the middle of an even length ranking. In such an even length
ranking, r(s) = |V |/2 results in a value slightly lower than 0 and r(s) = (|V |/2)+1 gives
a value slightly higher than 0.
If the partition S′ contains more than one node, then for each node s added to partition S
we compute its contribution to the metric in exactly the same way as outlined above for
|S|= 1. This means that given the functionality for |S|= 1 above, we retain functionality
for |S|> 1 as nodes s are added:
rd(S′,V ) = rd(S∪{s},V ) = 1
2
−
(
∑v∈S r(v)
|S| · (|V |+1) +
r(s)
|V |+1
)
=
1
2
− ∑v∈S r(v)+ r(s)
(|S|+1) · (|V |+1)
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=
1
2
− ∑v∈S∪{s} r(v)
(|S|+ |{s}|) · (|V |+1) =
1
2
− ∑v∈S′ r(v)|S′| · (|V |+1) .

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